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Original Intent in the First Congress 
Louis J. Sirico, Jr.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Arguing Original Intent in Legislative Debate 
A significant body of literature has examined how the Framers and rati-
fiers of the Constitution2 subsequently viewed the role of original intent in 
construing the Constitution. The primary focus of these works is how those 
views should influence today’s courts in deciding controversies.3 A less de-
veloped question, however, is how members of the First Congress employed 
originalist constitutional arguments in making and debating proposed stat-
utes.4 This study seeks to contribute to that exploration, not by discussing 
what the Founders believed about using originalist arguments, but by examin-
ing the record of the First Federalist Congress to determine what originalist 
arguments its members actually made.5
1. Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. 
2. This article follows the convention of referring to the delegates to the Consti-
tutional Convention as the Framers, the members of the state ratifying conventions as 
the ratifiers, and the leaders of that era as the Founders. At the close of the Constitu-
tional Convention, the framers forwarded the proposed Constitution to the Articles of 
Confederation Congress meeting in New York City. The Congress forwarded the 
proposal to the states which assembled state ratification conventions pursuant to Arti-
cle VII of the proposed Constitution. Once nine states ratified, the Confederation 
Congress took steps to elect the first Federal Congress and select a President. For a 
history of the ratification, see RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION (Michael Allen Gillespie 
& Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). For a documentary history, see THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 
1976–1995) [hereinafter DHRC]. 
 3. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
15-28 (2d ed. 2002); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE ch. 23, at 618-80 (2d ed. 1999); 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47-70 (3d ed. 2000) (sum-
marizing the debate on this issue). 
 4. The leading articles are Hans W. Baade, Original Intention: Raoul Berger’s 
Fake Antique, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1523 (1992); Raoul Berger, Original Intention in His-
torical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986); Charles A. Lofgren, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988); H. Jef-
ferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 
(1985). 
 5. Analytical narratives of the First Congress include CHARLENE BANGS 
BICKFORD & KENNETH BOWLING, BIRTH OF THE NATION: THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS, 1789-1791 (1989) (offering a very accessible narrative); DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 
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An examination of the Founders’ contemporary influences yields a 
somewhat surprising revelation: members of the First Congress discussing 
original intent. In the British and Commonwealth tradition, courts do not con-
sider legislative history when construing statutes.6 This principle ruled in the 
United States until at least the latter half of the nineteenth century.7 Another 
contemporary influence rejecting reliance on originalist arguments may have 
been the anti-interpretive tradition in American Protestantism, which was 
designed to reject questionable interpretations of scripture by relying solely 
on the words of the text.8 Thus, it is not surprising that at the First Congress, 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts relied on William Blackstone’s Commentar-
ies on the Laws of England for rules on interpreting the Constitution: 
The Judge [Blackstone] observes “[t]hat the fairest and most ra-
tional method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring 
his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the 
most probable, and these signs are either the words, the context, 
the subject matter, the effect and consequences, or the spirit and 
reason of the law.” With respect to words, the Judge observes that 
“they are generally understood in their usual and most ordinary 
signification, not so much regarding the grammar as their general 
and popular use.”9
However, reliance on legislative intent was acceptable in an earlier era. 
In the words of one historian: 
It is only after the middle of the fourteenth century, when judges 
find themselves no longer able to draw either upon the actual inten-
tion of the legislator or upon the royal dispensing power, that they 
are forced to construct a body of rules of statutory interpretation: a 
 
(1997) (providing a narrative account focusing on the constitutional issues that arose 
in debates on the major issues); JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION:
THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1999) (providing a narrative of 
deliberations over constitutional issues framed as a debate among members of first 
Congresses). For a narrative of elections to the First Congress and biographies of its 
members, see MARGARET C. S. CHRISTMAN, THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-
1791 (1989). Biographies also appear in XIV DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS, March 4, 1789-March 3, 1791, at 489-932 (Linda Grant DePauw 
et al. eds., 1972) [hereinafter DHFFC].  
 6. See Baade, supra note 4, at 1524-25; Powell, supra note 4, at 894-903. 
 7. See Baade, supra note 4, at 1527-28. 
 8. See Powell, supra note 4, at 889-94. 
 9. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 453 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COM-
MENTARIES *59). 
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document, and no longer the verbal explanations of one man to an-
other, becomes the sole basis for the judge’s action . . . .10 
Just as the judges of the early fourteenth century could draw on the 
memories of lawmakers, delegates to the First Congress could draw on the 
memories of several drafters of the Constitution and numerous members of 
the state ratifying conventions. The First Congress convened almost immedi-
ately after the Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying conventions.11
At least twenty-eight members of the House and fourteen members of the 
Senate had been delegates to their respective state ratifying conventions.12 
Nine delegates to the Constitutional Convention served in the House and 
eleven served in the Senate.13 Thus, Congress had easy access to sources of 
information about the intent of the Founders. Moreover, Congress was a leg-
islature and, unlike courts, was not required to adhere to rules that prohibited 
looking beyond the text and rules of statutory construction when interpreting 
a constitution. Interestingly, in these records, I find no suggestion that the 
 
10. Samuel E. Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon’s Case, 31 NW. U. L. 
REV. 202, 207 (1936). 
 11. The Constitutional Convention concluded on September 17, 1787. See JAMES 
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 659 (1966) 
[hereinafter MADISON’S NOTES]. The House of Representatives reached a quorum on 
April 1, 1789. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xvi. By that time, only North Carolina 
and Rhode Island had yet to ratify the Constitution. See infra notes 17-19 and accom-
panying text. 
 12. Members of the House who had served in their respective state ratifying 
conventions include Roger Sherman (Conn.), see XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 507-
08; Jeremiah Wadsworth (Conn.), id. at 520-21; George Matthews (Ga.), id. at 562; 
George Gale (Md.), id. at 586; Michael Jenifer Stone (Md.), id. at 598; Fisher Ames 
(Mass.), id. at 615; Jonathan Grout (Mass.), id. at 628; George Partridge (Mass.), id. 
at 633; Theodore Sedgwick (Mass.), id. at 637; Samuel Livermore (N.H.), id. at 666; 
Jeremiah Van Rensselaer (N.Y.), id. at 726; John Baptista Ashe (N.C.), id. at 739; 
Timothy Bloodworth (N.C.), see id. at 742; John Sevier (N.C.), id. at 746; John Steele 
(N.C.), id. at 748; Hugh Williamson (N.C.) id. at 753; Thomas Hartley (Pa.), id. at 
784; Frederick Augustus Muhlenburg (Pa.), id. at 793; Thomas Scott (Pa.), id. at 802; 
Henry Wynkoop (Pa.), id. at 808; Benjamin Bourn (R.I.), id. at 820; Aedanus Burke 
(S.C.), id. at 837; Thomas Sumter (S.C.), id. at 853; Theodorick Bland (Va.), id. at 
884; Isaac Coles (Va.), id. at 894; Richard Bland Lee (Va.), id. at 901; James Madison 
(Va.), see id. at 907; and Alexander White (Va.), id. at 928. 
 Members of the Senate who served in their respective state ratifying conven-
tions were Oliver Ellsworth (Conn.), id. at 493; William Samuel Johnson (Conn.), id. 
at 499; Richard Bassett (DE), id. at 529; William Few (Ga.), see id. at 542; Caleb 
Strong (Mass,), id. at 611; John Langdon (N.H.), id. at 650-51; Rufus King (N.Y.), id. 
at 701-02; Philip John Schuyler (N.Y.), see id. at 706; Benjamin Hawkins (N.C.), id. 
at 731; Samuel Johnston (N.C.), id. at 736; Theodore Foster (R.I.), id. at 814; Joseph 
Stanton (R.I.), id. at 818; William Grayson (Va.), id. at 867; and James Monroe, see 
id. at 877-78.  
 13. See BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 12. 
File: 61659-text.native.1164206890 Created on: 11/14/2006 10:39:00 AM Last Printed: 11/22/2006 6:52:00 AM 
690 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71  
 
rules of construction should be any different for a constitution than for a stat-
ute. Nonetheless, many years had passed since the fourteenth century, and 
members of Congress were unfamiliar with a tradition that would permit 
them to inquire into intent. However, as this study shows, the Founders were 
sometimes willing to make arguments that look beyond the text.  
For example, in contrast to Blackstone and Gerry, James Madison pos-
ited a more innovative and expansive set of rules of construction: 
An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the gov-
ernment cannot be just. 
Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they may 
be, are to be admitted — where doubtful, it is fairly triable by its 
consequences. 
In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument, 
if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide. 
Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evi-
dence of the meaning of the parties. 
In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the de-
gree of its incidentality to an express authority, is to be regarded,  
but the degree of its importance also; since on this will depend the 
probability or improbability if its being left to construction.14 
Nevertheless, throughout his life and with only a few deviations, Madison 
would consider evidence from the state ratifying conventions, but not the 
Constitutional Convention, because he regarded the Convention as only a 
drafting committee.15 
14. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 369. Gerry’s explication of Blackstone was a 
response to Madison’s canons. Late in life, Madison wrote that the most pertinent 
considerations in constitutional interpretation should be: 
1. The evils and defects for curing which the Constitution was called for 
& introduced. 
2. The comments prevailing at the time it was adopted. 
3. The early, deliberate & continued practice under the Constitution, as 
preferable to constructions adopted on the spur of occasions, and subject 
to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies. 
Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 267, 291 (1997) (quoting Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 
1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 370, 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)). 
 15. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 362-65 (1996); Donald O. Dewey, James Madison 
Helps Clio Interpret the Constitution, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 45-47 (1971) (dis-
cussing Madison’s reasons for discounting the proceedings of the Convention). Im-
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Courts and legislatures overlap with regard to how they employ the 
Constitution. Just as a court seeks to determine whether a statute is constitu-
tionally permissible, a legislature seeks to enact statutes that will pass consti-
tutional muster. However, a legislature also employs the Constitution for 
another function: to enact statutes that help further the purposes of the Consti-
tution or at least harmonize with those purposes. With respect to originalism, 
a legislature consults the Founders to define the contours of the Constitution 
and identify its purposes. 
This study examines the arguments that members of the First Congress 
made with respect to original intent. It identifies and classifies these argu-
ments in categories analogous to those that might be used in cataloguing ar-
guments based on canons of statutory construction. Given the overlapping 
functions of constitutional argument for courts and legislatures, the analogy 
should be unsurprising. 
Perhaps the study’s most significant finding is that members of the First 
Congress invoked originalist arguments a number of times. On a given issue, 
however, these arguments were positioned among many other arguments and 
were not necessarily the dispositive ones. As this study illustrates, they usu-
ally tended to deal with general policies underlying the Constitution rather 
than with specific words that the Constitution contained.  
 
mediately before declaring his canons of construction, Madison was speaking against 
establishing a national bank and arguing that Congress lacked the constitutional au-
thority to enact the legislation. When making his argument, Madison referred to the 
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention: “[h]is impression might perhaps be the 
stronger, because he well recollected that a power to grant charters of incorporation 
had been proposed in the general convention and rejected.” XIV DHFFC, supra note 
5, at 368. His recollection of the Convention proceedings was accurate. See 
MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 11, at 638-39. At the Congress, Madison arguably 
relied on the intent of the Convention in debates over compensation for members of 
Congress, and over the national government’s assumption of state debt. See infra text 
accompanying notes 82 & 90. Madison’s general refusal to rely on the proceedings of 
the Convention is consistent with his refusal to publish his notes on the Convention’s 
proceedings–our primary source of information on those proceedings during his life-
time. See DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE 
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 163-64 (1989) (discussing Madison’s reasons for not permitting 
an earlier publication). For more information on Madison’s theory of constitutional 
interpretation, see Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitu-
tion, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1997); Dewey, supra.
At the same time, Madison endorsed reliance on the proceedings of the state 
ratifying conventions. However, Jonathan Elliot’s Debates on the Federal Constitu-
tion, the first publication to provide widely accessible accounts of the conventions, 
was not published until 1936, the year of Madison’s death. See Dewey, supra, at 41. 
And, as to be expected, the sentiments of the various conventions were often at vari-
ance with one another. See id. at 41-42.  
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B. The First Congress and Its Documentary Record 
The First Congress met in three sessions: from March 4 until September 
29, 1789; from January 4 until August 12, 1790; and from December 6 until 
March 3, 1791.16 The first two sessions took place in New York City and the 
third was in Philadelphia.17 The Federalists dominated the new Congress, 
initially holding forty-nine of fifty-nine seats in the House and twenty of 
twenty-two seats in the Senate.18 At the onset of the first session, North Caro-
lina and Rhode Island had yet to ratify the Constitution and thus enjoyed no 
representation. On November 21, 1789, on its second attempt, North Carolina 
ratified the Constitution and sent two Federalist senators, three Federalist 
representatives, and two Antifederalist representatives to the second session 
of Congress.19 After encountering significant economic pressure,20 Rhode 
Island ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790 and sent a Federalist and an 
Antifederalist to the Senate and a Federalist to the House who served in the 
third congressional session.21 
Because we have only limited accounts of the First Congress, this study 
is necessarily limited to the floor debates in the House of Representatives. 
Until 1795,22 the Senate followed the tradition of the Constitutional Conven-
tion,23 the Articles of Confederation Congress,24 and the British Parliament 
(until the mid 1770s)25 of meeting behind closed doors. As a result, our re-
cord of its proceedings consist primarily of the Senate Legislative Journal, the 
 
16. See BICKFORD, supra note 5, at v. 
 17. Id. 
18. Id. at 4. 
 19. See CHRISTMAN, supra note 4, at 86-89 (describing North Carolina’s ratifica-
tion and the ensuing selection of senators and representatives: Federalist Senators 
Samuel Johnston and Benjamin Hawkins, Federalist representatives Hugh William-
son, John Steele, and John Sevier, and Antifederalist representatives John Baptista 
Ashe and Timothy Bloodworth). 
 20. The federal government subjected goods produced in Rhode Island to cus-
toms duties as if they were imported from a foreign country and then enacted legisla-
tion that would impose a ban on all commercial trade between Rhode Island and the 
United States and require Rhode Island to pay $27,000 as its cost of discharging fed-
eral obligations incurred prior to the effective date of the Constitution. See CURRIE,
supra note 5, at 97-98.  
 21. See CHRISTMAN, supra note 5, at 90-94 (describing Rhode Island’s ratifica-
tion and selection of Federalist Senator Theodore Foster, Antifederalist Senator Jo-
seph Stanton, Jr., and Federalist representative Benjamin Bourn). 
 22. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xv-xvi. 
 23. See id. at xv. 
 24. Id. 
25. The process of disclosure of the proceedings in the popular press was a grad-
ual one with the House of Commons fully acquiescing in 1772 and the House of 
Lords fully acquiescing in 1775. Id. at xiv. 
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Senate Executive Journal,26 and the extant notes and diaries of some sena-
tors,27 none of which provide an account of floor debates helpful to this study. 
For deliberations in the House, however, a considerable record is avail-
able. Until recently, the standard source was Gale and Seaton’s Debates and 
Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (also known as the Annals 
of Congress).28 Its volumes covering the First Congress were not published 
until 1834 and consisted of reports taken from Thomas Lloyd’s Congres-
sional Register and John Fenno’s Gazette of the United States,29 both con-
temporaneous records that were privately printed. However, in recent years, 
scholars have benefited from the publication of the multi-volumed series 
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-91,30 which com-
piles all extant records of that congress, including the Congressional Register,
the Gazette of the United States, Thomas Lloyd’s unpublished shorthand 
notes,31 articles appearing in two newspapers, The [New York] Daily Adver-
tiser, and The New-York Daily Gazette, as well as other available partial ac-
counts of the proceedings. Although the records include the errors and incon-
sistencies inherent in virtually any reportage,32 they offer a tremendous re-
source for those interested in the nation’s founding. 
 
26. See I DHFFC, supra note 5 (reproducing the Senate Legislative Journal); II 
DHFFC at 3-34 (reproducing the Senate Executive Journal). Article I, section 5, 
clause 3 of the Constitution provides: “Each House shall keep a Journal of its Pro-
ceedings, and from time to time publish the same . . . .” However, this provision was 
not construed to require publishing floor debates. See CURRIE, supra note 5, at 10.  
 27. The lengthiest and most detailed diary is that of William Maclay of Penn-
sylvania. See IX DHFFC, supra note 5, at 3-401. Maclay apparently was a difficult 
individual whose personality distorted his account. See id. at xi-xii. 
 28. 1 & 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
(Joseph Gales, Jr. & William W. Seaton eds., 1834). With the exception of one speech 
from another source, these volumes include only the contents of the Congressional 
Register and the Gazette of the United States. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xxvii. 
For a history of the efforts of Gale and Seaton, see id. at xxiii-xxvii. 
 29. Fenno’s Gazette of the United States published accounts of the debates of the 
First Congress beginning on April 15, 1789. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xxxv. 
For a history of Fenno’s efforts, see id. at xxxiv-xxxviii. 
 30. The House debates of the First Congress appear in volumes X through XIV; 
the Journal of the House of Representatives appears in volume III. See DHFFC, supra 
note 5. I have enormous respect and sympathy for the generations of historians who 
studied the First Congress by squinting at microfiche or at crumbling pages of tiny 
print for hours on end. 
 31. Lloyd’s shorthand notes contain records that never saw publication in the 
short-lived Congressional Register. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at xxxiii. 
 32. Later in life, Madison complained that Lloyd’s notes were “very defective, 
and abound in errors, some of them very gross, where the speeches were not revised 
by the author.” See id. at xxvi-xxvii. 
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C. Methodology 
This study examines the debates in the House of Representatives for in-
stances in which members based their arguments on the intent of the Foun-
ders. The study classifies the arguments in five rhetorical categories.33
1. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Founders’ Intent Ex-
pressed at the State Ratifying Conventions. 
2. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention. 
3. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Evils that the Constitu-
tional Convention Sought to Avoid. 
4. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Proceedings of the 
Congress under the Articles of Confederation. 
5. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Publications Widely Circu-
lated during the Constitution’s Ratification. 
The study then refines some categories into a number of subcategories, 
with most subcategories offering only a few examples. The variety of sub-
categories and the limited number of examples for each suggest that no one 
method of argument was singularly effective with respect to the various top-
ics of debate. 
Two issues of methodology deserve attention: the definition of “original 
intent” and the difficulty of determining which speaker arguments to include 
in the study. Depending on the context, the definition of “original intent” 
could range from the decisions and purposes of the Framers in selecting the 
words of the Constitution, to the meanings of the Constitution’s words, or to 
the “impressions and interpretations of the Constitution formed by its original 
readers, citizens, polemicists, and convention delegates who participated in 
one way or another in ratification.”34 This study takes a relatively narrow 
view; it includes only arguments in which a House member made a reference 
to the Constitution’s legislative history (broadly construed) when arguing that 
(1) a proposal was or was not constitutional or (2) the legislative history was 
relevant to the proposal’s merits. A broader view would risk including a large 
 
33. In selecting these categories, I have relied heavily on CHESTER J. ANTIEU,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1982), which necessarily draws on the traditional 
canons of statutory construction. See NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION (6th ed. 2002) (the leading treatise on statutory construction). 
 34. RAKOVE, supra note 15, at 8. I borrow my description of the range of the 
possible definitions of “original intent” from Professor Rakove who distinguishes 
between “intent,” “meaning,” and “understanding.” See id. at 7-9. 
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number of arguments whose connection with originalism is quite tenuous. 
Even with this narrow definition of intent, determining which arguments to 
classify as originalist requires making difficult choices. 
The following three examples illustrate the methodology of the study 
and how it addresses the close cases.  
First Example: In a debate over whether to give the President the power 
to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from office,35 Abraham Baldwin 
of Georgia argued that such a delegation of authority would mix the powers 
of the President and Senate, thus violating the principle of separation of pow-
ers. He noted that the Constitution requires the President to receive the advice 
and consent of the Senate in making such an appointment, but does not re-
quire such a concurrence in order to remove an officer.36 Baldwin argued that 
“[t]he senate must concur with the president in making appointments, but 
with respect to the removal they are not associated; no such clause is in the 
constitution; and therefore I should conclude, that the convention did not 
chuse they should have the power.”37 Although Baldwin invoked only the 
Framers’ implied intent, the reliance on intent is strong enough to merit in-
cluding the argument in this study. 
Second Example: One debate considered whether to amend the Constitu-
tion so that after the first census and until the size of the House reached one 
hundred members, there should be one representative for every thirty thou-
sand citizens. After the House reached one hundred members, the number of 
representatives should be not be less than one hundred or more than one hun-
dred seventy five, with each state having at least one representative.38 The 
Constitution states that after the first census, “The Number of Representatives 
shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at 
Least one Representative . . . .”39 Some House members were concerned that 
the potential size of the body would be unmanageably large or undemocrati-
cally too small, and in the course of the debate, some members proposed 
amendments to reduce or increase the potential size by various methods.40 
35. For a summary of this debate, see CURRIE, supra note 5, at 36-41. 
 36. “[A]nd he shall nominate, and by and with the [a]dvice and [c]onsent of the 
Senate, shall appoint [a]mbassadors, other public [m]inisters and [c]onsuls, [j]udges 
of the [S]upreme [C]ourt, and all other [o]fficers of the United States, whose 
[a]ppointments are not herein otherwise provided for.” U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.  
 37. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1005. 
 38. Id. at 1242-53 (recording the debate). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. 
 40. John Vining of Delaware unsuccessfully proposed “that where the number of 
inhabitants of any particular state amounts to 45,000, they shall be entitled to two 
representatives.” XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1243. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts 
unsuccessfully proposed that after the first census, there should be one representative 
for every 40,000 until the number reached 100. Id. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachu-
setts successfully moved to increase the ultimate size of the House to 200. Id. at 1249. 
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire unsuccessfully moved to increase the mini-
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Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention, explained that the proposed Constitution initially required a ratio 
of one representative to forty thousand citizens, but that the ratio was reduced 
when George Washington requested the lesser ratio “as more favorable to the 
public interest.”41
Although Sherman’s statement refers to proceedings at the Constitu-
tional Convention, it is not part of an argument that a proposal before the 
Congress is or is not constitutional. Moreover, his statement is not suffi-
ciently relevant to the merits of the proposal under consideration. Therefore, 
the statement is not part of this study. 
Third Example: In a debate on a proposal to pay the senators a salary of 
six dollars per day and members of the House five dollars per day,42 James 
Madison argued in favor of the proposition:  
[H]e observed, that it had been evidently contemplated by the con-
stitution, to distinguish in favor of the senate, that men of abilities 
and firm principles, whom the love and custom of a retired life 
might render averse to the fatigues of a public one, may be induced 
to devote the experience of years, and the acquisitions of study, to 
the service of their country.43 
Although the study includes Madison’s argument, it excludes this state-
ment by Joshua Seney of Maryland: “[g]entlemen have brought forward the 
constitution upon this occasion, but I conceive it to be opposed to the very 
principle that they mean to advocate. This will destroy the independence of 
the several branches, which is to be strictly observed.”44 
The decision to include Madison’s statement was a close one, because 
Madison’s reference to the Framers’ intent was quite indirect. However, the 
decision to exclude Seney’s statement was not difficult, because Seney re-
ferred only to very general principles underlying the Constitution. 
 
mum size of the House to 200. Id. at 1252. The initial motion, as amended by Sedg-
wick’s motion, passed with 27 members for and 20 against. Id. at 1254.  
 41. Id. at 1249. Sherman’s recollection was largely accurate. Washington en-
dorsed a proposal by Nathaniel Gorham to this effect, and the Convention agreed to it 
unanimously. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 11, at 655. However, Madison, who 
unlike Sherman, supported a larger House, was critical of Sherman’s reference to the 
Constitutional Convention: “[He] [h]oped gentlemen would not be influenced by what 
had been related to have passed in the convention; he expected the committee would 
determine upon their own sense of propriety.” XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1250. 
Madison’s criticism was consistent with his rejection of looking to the Convention 
proceedings in matters of construction. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
 42. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1136-39 (recording the debate). 
 43. Id. at 1152. 
 44. Id. at 1154. 
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Because the statements of the members of the House are often unclear in 
explaining the extent to which they rely on the Founders’ intent, if at all, 
some decisions on what to include in the study may generate points of dis-
agreement. Moreover, it is true that some references to the Framers and ratifi-
ers may refer not to their intentions but to arguments based on the Constitu-
tion’s language and structure.45 The lines of demarcation are often unclear. At 
the same time, with so many representatives having served in the Articles of 
Confederation Congress, the Constitutional Convention, and the state ratify-
ing conventions, members of the House must have engaged in informal con-
versations that informed them about the intent of participants in the Constitu-
tion’s legislative history. Thus, the recorded speeches must be read in light of 
what the representatives must have known.  
The remainder of this article examines the First Congress’s originalist 
arguments. As previously mentioned, there are four categories of arguments, 
often with subcategories in each. Since originalist arguments are attempts to 
give effect to the Constitution’s text, the article includes the relevant constitu-
tional provisions to give context to the arguments. 
II. ORIGINAL INTENT ARGUMENTS 
1.00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Founders’ Intent      
Expressed at the State Ratifying Conventions  
 
Of the arguments based on original intent, those relying on statements at 
the state ratifying conventions would seem the most persuasive. The conven-
tions were an essential part of the legislating process and, in fact, the final 
step. 
In the First Congress, delegates relied on the ratifying conventions in 
debating four topics: the President’s power to remove the head of an execu-
tive department, the House’s authority to participate in structuring treaty ne-
gotiations, the establishment of a national bank, where to place amendments 
in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, and assuming 
the debts of the states. 
 
45. See Powell, supra note 3, at 948 (stating that at the time, a reference to 
“original intent” “referred to the ‘intentions’ of the sovereign parties to the constitu-
tional compact, as evidenced in the Constitution’s language and discerned through 
structural methods of interpretation; it did not refer to the personal intentions of the 
framers or anyone else”). This study suggests that Professor Powell’s conclusion 
invites further examination. 
File: 61659-text.native.1164206890 Created on: 11/14/2006 10:39:00 AM Last Printed: 11/22/2006 6:52:00 AM 
698 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71  
 
1.01. Follow Policy Sentiments Expressed at the State Ratifying     
Conventions 
A. Removing the Head of an Executive Department 
A major controversy in the First Congress was whether the President 
had the power to remove a federal officer. According to two historians, “The 
resolution forced Congress to confront and define basic tenets of constitu-
tional interpretation relating to the meaning of separation of powers, advice 
and consent, checks and balances, and impeachment.”46 A number of consti-
tutional provisions are relevant to this debate. 
Article II, section 4 of the Constitution provides: “The President, Vice 
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from 
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Article I, section 3, clause 6 gives the Sen-
ate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” No other provisions deal with 
removing federal officers. Article II, section 2, paragraph 2 states that the 
President shall “nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . 
and all other Officers of the United States.” Article I, section 8, clause 18, 
authorizes Congress to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested 
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof.”  
In May, 1789, James Madison (Va.) proposed establishing a department 
of foreign affairs, to be headed by the secretary of the department of foreign 
affairs. This secretary would be appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, but could be removed only by the President.47 The 
First Congress debated the constitutionality of permitting the President to 
remove the officer without the concurrence of the Senate. 
Arguing against the proposal, Elbridge Gerry (Mass.) rejected the con-
tention that Madison’s proposal could find authorization under the “necessary 
and proper clause” unless the clause was construed in an extraordinarily 
broad manner: 
By this very act the house are assuming a power to alter the consti-
tution. . . . Such a power would render the most important clause in 
 
46. BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 38. For summaries of the debate, see id. at 38-41; 
CURRIE, supra note 5, at 36-41; LYNCH, supra note 5, at 54-63. After a lengthy de-
bate, the house indirectly voted to give the President the power of removal. See XI 
DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1043. The Senate, however, was evenly divided, requiring 
Vice President Adams to cast the deciding vote approving the removal power. See I 
DHFFC, supra note 5, at 86. 
 47. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at 725. 
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the constitution [presumably Article II, section 2, clause 18] nuga-
tory, and one without which, I will be bold to say, this system of 
government would never have been ratified.48
Also speaking in opposition to the proposal, Alexander White (Va.) ar-
gued that the Constitution should be strictly construed and not be read liber-
ally to give excessive power to the President. In support of this position, he 
relied on Virginia’s statement of ratification, which contained numerous pro-
posals for amendments, including ones that would limit federal power: 
I will only remark that the state of North-Carolina has expressed 
nearly the same sentiments as Virginia, with this difference, that 
Carolina would not adopt the constitution till it was satisfied of this 
principle, that we could not by constructive acts enlarge our pow-
ers, in order at a future day to destroy the state governments, and 
with them the liberties of the people.49 
Not all delegates shared the concerns of Gerry and White. Elias 
Boudinot (N.J.) supported the proposal on removal and referred to the senti-
ment expressed in the ratification conventions that the Constitution failed to 
provide for a sufficient separation of powers. He argued that relying on the 
legislative impeachment process for removal would amount to a “further 
blending of the executive and legislative powers” contrary to the principle of 
separation.50 
James Jackson (Ga.), who opposed the proposal, saw no such difficulty 
in blending legislative and executive powers by relying on the impeachment 
process. In support of his position, he cited James Wilson at the Pennsylvania 
ratifying convention: “[t]he celebrated Mr. Wilson agrees with me in this 
sentiment, for he declares that the senate was constituted a check upon the 
president. Let gentlemen turn over his speeches, delivered in the convention 
of Pennsylvania, and they will find he asserts it as an incontrovertible fact.”51 
B. Appointing Commissioners to Negotiate Indian Treaties 
In August 1789, the House considered a proposal for negotiating treaties 
with Indian tribes and appointing no more than three commissioners to serve 
as negotiators. One issue was whether the clause limiting the number of 
 
48. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 930. For a report of the same speech employing 
different wording, see id. at 902. 
 49. Id. at 941-42. 
 50. Id. at 966.  
 51. Id. at 1002-03. 
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commissioners unconstitutionally interfered with the management of treaties 
by the President and Senate.52 
Article II, section 2, paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides: “[The 
President] shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present con-
cur . . . .”  
William Smith (Md. or S.C.) argued that the House lacked authority to 
play a role in the matter: “I know it has been debated in some of the state 
conventions, whether it is proper to let the president and senate have this 
power, some have thought the president ought to have it exclusively, others 
have judged it most eligible that the senate is associated with him, but I never 
heard that any one thought the legislature should have concurrent jurisdiction 
with them . . . .”53 
C. Establishing a National Bank 
A vigorously debated issue in the First Congress was the establishment 
of a national bank. 54 However, the delegates disagreed over whether the Con-
stitution authorized Congress to create such a powerful institution. 
Article I, section 8, Paragraph 18 authorizes Congress to “make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” James Madi-
son (Va.) argued that the “necessary and proper clause” was not broad 
enough to authorize establishing a national bank, and that it “gave no addi-
tional powers to those enumerated.”55 In support of his position, he read 
“sundry passages from the debates of the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North-
Carolina conventions, shewing the grounds on which the constitution had 
been vindicated by its principle advocates, against a dangerous latitude of its 
powers, charged on it by its opponents.”56 
52. See id. at 1192-1200 (reporting the debate on this issue, which ended with 
the House striking the provision on the number of permissible commissioners). 
 53. Id. at 1195-96. 
 54. For summaries of the debate on the successful proposal, see BICKFORD, su-
pra note 5, at 73-75; CURRIE, supra note 5, at 78-80; LYNCH, supra note 5, at 77-90. 
 55. XIV DHFFC, supra note , at 374. See BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 73 (“His 
opponents considered the argument merely a smokescreen for his real interests . . . .”) 
Southerners like Madison feared that because the bank would be located in Philadel-
phia, the bill would make that city both the financial and political capital of the coun-
try. Id. They also believed that a national bank would become a banking monopoly 
that would benefit northern merchants. See LYNCH, supra note 5, at 78. 
 56. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 374. 
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Further, Madison argued that “[t]he explanatory declarations and 
amendments accompanying the ratifications of the several states formed a 
striking evidence, wearing the same complexion.”57
1.02. Follow the Policy Sentiments Expressed at the State Ratifying 
Conventions with Great Caution  
A. Establishing a National Bank 
In the ongoing debate over a national bank, delegates employed a num-
ber of arguments. In disagreeing with Madison’s reliance on state ratifying 
conventions, Elbridge Gerry (Mass.), discounted the records of the state con-
ventions. He noted that “the debates of the state conventions, as published by 
the short-hand writers, were generally partial and mutilated.”58 Moreover, 
these records were sometimes one-sided, omitting the arguments of the Anti-
federalists. In addition to being one sided, the speeches of a few participants 
may not express the sense of an entire convention. Furthermore, given the 
underlying struggle between the Federalists and Antifederalists, participants 
could be induced “to depart from candor, and to call in the aid of art, flattery, 
professions of friendship, promises of office, and even good cheer.” as well 
as make threats of political death to those who disagreed.59 
1.03. Follow the Specific Wishes Expressed at the State Ratifying  
Conventions on Specific Issues 
A. Interweaving Amendments to the Constitution Within the Constitu-
tion or Appending them as a Supplement  
In the debates over drafting amendments to the Constitution, a dispute 
erupted over whether the amendments should be interwoven into the body of 
the document or added as a supplement.60 
Article V sets out procedures for amending the Constitution and pro-
vides that when the procedures are satisfied, the amendments “shall be valid 
for all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution.” William L. Smith 
(S.C.) argued in favor of incorporating the amendments. He “[r]ead extracts 
from the amendments proposed by several of the state conventions at the time 
they ratified the constitution, from which he said it appeared that they were 
generally of the opinion that the phraseology of the constitution ought to be 
altered; nor would this mode of proceeding repeal any part of the constitution 
 
57. Id. at 375. 
 58. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 460. 
 59. See XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 460. 
 60. See XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1212-16, 1221-31, 1308 (reporting this 
debate).  
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but such as it touched, the remainder will be in force during the time of con-
sidering it and ever after.”61 
B. Drafting the Tenth Amendment 
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” In the debates 
over its drafting, Antifederalist Thomas Tucker (Va.) unsuccessfully moved 
“to add the word ‘expressly’ so as to read ‘The powers not expressly dele-
gated by this constitution.’”62 The proposal was designed to narrow the au-
thority of the national government by denying the government any powers by 
implication. In opposing Tucker’s motion, James Madison stated “he remem-
bered the word ‘expressly’ had been moved in the convention of Virginia, by 
the opponents to the ratification, and after full and fair discussion was given 
up by them, and the system allowed to retain its present form.”63 
C. Abolishing Slavery 
In Spring 1790, Quakers petitioned Congress to forbid vessels employed 
in the international slave trade from using ports in Pennsylvania.64 In debating 
the petition, delegates to the First Congress considered whether Article I sec-
tion 9 prohibited the Quaker’s proposal. 
Article I, section 9, clause 1 of the Constitution forbids Congress from 
prohibiting “The Migration and Importation of [slaves] . . . prior to the Year 
one thousand eight hundred and eight . . . .” While debating this measure, 
William L. Smith (S.C.) argued that the southern states would never have 
ratified the Constitution if it did not offer protection to slavery. “On entering 
into this government, [the southern states] apprehended that the other states 
not knowing the necessity the citizens of the southern states were under to 
hold this species of property, would, from motives of humanity and benevo-
lence, be led to vote for a general emancipation; and had they not seen, that 
 
61. Id. at 1230. 
 62. Id. at 1300.  
 63. Id. at 1301. In The Federalist, Madison had defended the “necessary and 
proper clause” (Art. I, § 8, cl. 18), against the charge that the Constitution should have 
prohibited the exercise of any power not expressly delegated to the national govern-
ment. If the Constitution had included such a provision, he argued, “it is evident that 
the new Congress would be continually exposed . . . to the alternative of construing 
the term ‘expressly’ with so much rigour as to disarm the government of all real au-
thority whatever, or so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the restric-
tion.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 303 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 64. See CURRIE, supra note 5, at 66-67 (summarizing the debate). 
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the constitution provided against the effect of such a disposition, I may be 
bold to say, they never would have adopted it . . . .”65 
D. Assuming State Debts and the Threat of Direct Taxes 
A controversial topic in the First Congress was whether the national 
government should assume the debts of the states and pay them as debts of 
the United States. Many congressmen weighed in on this issue and employed 
varying types of original intent arguments.66
Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution states: “Congress shall 
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States.” Andrew Moore (Va.) argued that paying the state debts would 
require imposing a direct tax on the states.  
I remember well, when the constitution was under [consideration] 
in the [C]onvention of Virginia. The power of imposing a direct 
tax was warmly opposed — The advocates for its adoption stated 
. . . [t]hat occasions might happen in which such a power would 
be necessary — That it never would be exercised but in case of 
necessity — But we are about to attempt it when no such neces-
sity exists. If the convention had supposed it would have been at-
tempted at so early a day, I think they would have not yet adopted 
the constitution.67 
2.00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention 
 
The number of references to the Constitutional Convention is remark-
able in that it was held behind closed doors.68 Madison’s Notes, the only full 
record of the Convention, were published posthumously in 1840 and there-
fore were not available to the First Congress.69 Nonetheless, references to the 
Convention debates arise in discussions of nine topics: presidential authority 
to remove the head of an executive department, imposing a duty on tonnage, 
 
65. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 310. 
 66. For summaries of the debate, see BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 61-66; CURRIE,
supra note 5, at 76-78; LYNCH, supra note 5, at 71-77. The proposal eventually passed 
as the result of a compromise: A reimbursement would be awarded to Virginia and 
other states for the part of the debt they had already paid off, and beginning in 1800, 
the new capital would be permanently located on the Potomac. LYNCH, supra note 5, 
at 76. 
 67. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 556. 
 68. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 11, at viii.  
 69. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, (Max Farrand, 
ed., 1911) at xv. 
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taxing the slave trade, compensating members of Congress, paying creditors 
of the United States, assuming state debts, abolishing slavery, exempting 
members of Congress from the state militias, and establishing a national 
bank. 
2.01. Follow Policy Sentiments Expressed at the Constitutional Con-
vention. 
A. Removing the Head of an Executive Department 
When James Madison moved for the establishment of a department of 
foreign affairs with a secretary who would be removable by the President, he 
triggered a debate over whether the President could remove an executive offi-
cer without the advice and consent of the Senate.70 
Article II, section 4 of the Constitution provides: “The President, Vice 
President and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from 
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Article I, section 3, clause 6 gives the Sen-
ate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” No other provisions deal with 
removing federal officers. Article II, section 2, clause 2 states that the Presi-
dent shall “nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . and all 
other Officers of the United States.”  
Speaking in opposition to Madison’s proposal, John Page (Va.) argued 
that it would give the President far more power than the Constitutional Con-
vention could have intended: “This was never the intention of the constitu-
tion, or [the President] would have had the sole power of appointing. The 
framers of the government had confidence in the senate, or they would not 
have combined them with the executive in the performance of his duties.”71 
Also speaking in opposition to the proposal, Roger Sherman (Conn.), a 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, observed “[t]he convention, who 
formed this constitution, thought it would tend to secure the liberties of the 
people, if they prohibited the president from the sole appointment of all offi-
cers.”72 
Abraham Baldwin (Ga.) disagreed with Sherman and Page. He argued 
that the proposal would violate the principle of separation of powers by 
“mingling the powers of the president and senate.”73 He noted that at the 
Constitutional Convention, such mingling met with opposition: “[s]ome gen-
tlemen opposed it to the last; and finally it was the principal ground on which 
 
70. Id. at 725. For background information on this controversy, see supra notes 
46-53 accompanying text. 
 71. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 957. 
 72. Id. at 977. 
 73. Id. at 1003-04. 
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they refused to give it their signature and assent. One gentleman74 called it a 
monstrous and unnatural connection; and did not hesitate to affirm, it would 
bring convulsions to government.”75 
B. Imposing a Duty on Tonnage 
As one means of raising revenue, Congress considered a tonnage bill 
that would impose a duty on each foreign ship entering a United States port 
proportional to the ship’s carrying capacity.76 
Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution states: “Congress shall 
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” Article I, 
section 9, clause 6 provides “nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, 
be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.” Relying on his construc-
tion of Article I, section 9, clause 6, Theodorick Bland (Va.) proposed an 
amendment that would exempt from the duty vessels bound from one port to 
another within the United States.77 When other delegates disagreed with his 
reading of that provision, Bland defended it by relying on an underlying pol-
icy consideration: “[i]t was however well known that the Convention, in 
framing this article, designed [it] to encourage the coasting trade.”78 
C. Taxing the Slave Trade 
Article I, section 9, clause 1 of the Constitution states that “a Tax or 
duty may be imposed on such Importation [of slaves] not exceeding ten dol-
lars for each Person.” At the Congress, Josiah Parker (Va.) moved an amend-
ment that would impose a ten dollar tax on every slave imported into the 
United States.79 He argued that “it was the prevailing expectation that some 
measure should be entered into by the general government against the slave 
trade–That the constitution itself was calculated upon this idea.”80 
74. Baldwin evidently referred to Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who had 
served with him at the Constitutional Convention.  See id. at 1004 n.32. 
 75. Id. at 1004. 
 76. BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 31-32 (summarizing the debate on the proposal, 
which was defeated in the Senate).  
 77. See X DHFFC, supra note 5, at 410-11 (reporting the debate on Bland’s 
amendment). 
 78. Id. at 410. 
 79. See id. at 642; see also id. at 642-51 (reporting the debate, with Parker even-
tually withdrawing his motion). 
 80. Id. at 642. 
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D. Compensating Members of Congress 
The members of the First Congress also debated a proposal to pay 
House members five dollars per day and Senators six dollars per day. 81 
Article I, § 6, clause 1 of the Constitution states: “The Senators and 
Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascer-
tained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.” Arguing in 
favor of the different pay scales, James Madison (Va.) claimed implicit sup-
port from the Constitution’s drafters: 
[H]e observed, that it had been evidently contemplated by the con-
stitution, to distinguish in favor of the senate, that men of abilities 
and firm principles, whom the love and custom of a retired life 
might render averse to the fatigues of a public one, may be induced 
to devote the experience of years, and the acquisitions of study, to 
the service of their country.82 
E. Paying Creditors of the United States 
The First Congress had to pay the debts incurred during the American 
Revolution. One particularly troubling issue was how to repay the two types 
of creditors: original holders (individuals who loaned money to the United 
States and now held public securities), and nonoriginal holders (individuals 
who had purchased securities from the original holders at a deep discount.)  
Article VI, clause 1 of the Constitution states: “All Debts contracted and 
Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be 
valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confed-
eration.” James Madison proposed paying the nonoriginal holders the highest 
market value and then paying the original holders the balance of what the 
government owed on the original securities.83 
In opposing Madison’s proposal, Fisher Ames (Mass.) argued that the 
government should pay the full amount owed to all holders of securities: 
If we pursue another kind of policy [not Madison’s proposal], such 
as the preamble to the constitution declares to be the objects of the 
government; this government and this country may expect a more 
than Roman fortune. . . . That gentleman [Madison] helped to 
 
81. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1149-56 (reporting the debate on the failed pro-
posal to have discriminatory salaries). Later, the Senate successfully insisted on a 
salary differential for 1795; however, in 1796, the salaries were equalized. See 
BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 21. 
 82. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1152. 
 83. See XII DHFFC. supra note 5, at 294. After a brief debate, Madison’s pro-
posal was rejected “by a considerable majority.” Id. at 474. 
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frame the constitution–I have no doubt it is the better for his emi-
nent abilities–I hope that his love of his own work and his zeal for 
the cause which he has so ably supported, will induce him to aban-
don a measure, which tends so fatally to disappoint the first wishes 
of his own heart, and the hopes of his country.84
2.02. Accept a Proposal that the Constitutional Convention Did Not 
Enact, but Seemed to Favor. 
A. Assuming State Debts 
As previously mentioned, the First Congress debated whether the na-
tional government should assume the state’s debts and pay them as debts of 
the United States.85 Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution states: 
“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States.”  
Elbridge Gerry (Mass.), a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, re-
called discussions at the Convention indicating that assumption of the debts 
“was in contemplation from the very commencement of the new govern-
ment.”86 According to Gerry, the delegates did not include a provision on this 
point for two reasons. First, the proposition they discussed did not go as far as 
some delegates wished, and second, other parts of the Constitution authorized 
the assumption: 
It was opposed, on this ground, that it did not extend to the repay-
ment of that part which the states had sunk, as well as that which 
remained unpaid. . . . [H]ad it not been for this objection, I believe 
the very provision, which gentlemen say was never expected, 
would have been incorporated into the constitution itself. If I recol-
lect right, it was also contended in convention, that the proposition 
would be useless, as congress were authorised, under other parts of 
the constitution, to make full provision on this head.87 
Roger Sherman (Conn.) agreed with Gerry because, “[i]t was mentioned 
in the general convention–but it was not thought necessary or proper to insert 
 
84. Id. at 345. 
 85. For background information on this issue, see supra note 66 
 86. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 576. 
 87. Id. See also XIII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1719 (making the same argument 
and finding support in a similar recollection by Roger Sherman, also a delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention). 
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it in the constitution, for Congress would have sufficient power to adopt if 
they should judge it expedient.”88 
Later, James Madison (Va.) relied on his recollection of the Convention 
to dispute Gerry’s argument: 
If as we have been told, the assumption originated in the conven-
tion, why were not words inserted that would have incorporated 
and made the state debts part of the debts of the United States? Sir, 
if there was a majority who disapproved of the measure, certainly 
no argument can be drawn from this source; if there was a majority 
who approved of it, but thought it inexpedient to make it a part of 
the constitution, they must have been restrained by a fear that it 
might produce dissentions and render the success of their plan 
doubtful. I do recollect that such a measure was proposed, and, if 
my memory does not deceive me, the very gentleman [Gerry]89
who now appeals to the constitution in support of his argument, 
disrelished the measure at that time, and assigned for a reason, that 
it would administer relief perhaps exactly in proportion as the 
states had been deficient in making exertions.90
2.03. Reject a Proposal that a Significant Number of Delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention Rejected. 
A. Abolishing Slavery 
In an effort to impede the slave trade, a group of Quakers petitioned 
Congress to ban from Pennsylvania ports vessels employed in the interna-
tional slave trade.91 Article I, section 9, clause 1 of the Constitution forbids 
Congress from prohibiting “[t]he [m]igration and [i]mportation of [slaves] . . . 
prior to the [y]ear one thousand eight hundred and eight . . . .”  
In opposing the committing of the petition to a committee, Abraham 
Baldwin (Ga.) argued that the Constitution banned the abolition of the slave 
trade until 1808. He emphasized that the Southern delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention were “so tender upon this point, that they had well nigh 
broken up without coming to any determination,” but conceded “from the 
 
88. XIII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1421. 
 89. The original newspaper report stated “Sherman” instead of “Gerry,” but 
corrected the error in a later issue. Id. at 1176 n.55.  
 90. Id. at 1175-76. At the Constitutional Convention, Gerry had supported as-
sumption of the state debts, but had also pointed out that “as the States had made 
different degrees of exertion to sink their respective debts, those who had done most 
would be alarmed if they were now to be saddled with a share of the debts of the 
states which had done least.” MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 11, at 495.  
 91. For background information on the debate, see supra note 64 
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extreme desire of preserving the union.”92 Moreover, “the constitution jeal-
ously guarded what they agreed to.”93 Baldwin stated that an examination of 
“the footsteps of that body” would show “the greatest degree of caution used 
to imprint them, so as not to be easily eradicated; but from the moment we go 
to jostle on that ground . . . I fear we shall feel it tremble under our feet.”94
2.04. Reject a Proposal that the Constitutional Convention              
Apparently Rejected 
A. Assuming State Debts95 
In the debate over whether the national government should assume the 
debts of the states and then pay them as debts of the United States,96 James 
Jackson (Ga.) cited Elbridge Gerry’s references to discussions at the Consti-
tutional Convention and interpreted them as confirming that the state debts 
“were not respected as the debts of the Union by the convention.” 97 He ar-
gued: “[t]he convention met, and the constitution was formed, for the restora-
tion of public credit, and if the state debts were a part of the debt of the Un-
ion, provision would have been made for them . . . .” Thus, “if the convention 
had no power to insert them in the constitution, whence all our powers are 
derived; neither, Sir, have we the power under that constitution to provide for 
the payment of them.”98 
Michael Jenifer Stone (Md.) also argued that the Framers did not intend 
that the national government should assume state debts: 
Was it the intention of the framers of this government, and does 
their work contain the idea, that the union should assume the debts 
of the particular states? Will it give the general government a 
greater degree of power? I apprehend that it may: If, then, it be a 
power not contemplated in the constitution, is it not an assumed 
power? This deduction is clear to my mind.99 
Although Andrew Moore (Va.) supported a compromise proposal, he 
found no constitutional barrier to having the national government assume 
 
92. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 308. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution states: “Congress shall have 
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” 
 96. For background information on this debate, see supra note 66. 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. 
 98. XIII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1697. 
 99. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 542. 
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state debt: “I think the framers of the constitution contemplated the payment 
of the debts of the United States only. But from our assuming the state debts, 
they become the debts of the United States, and we are to pay them.”100
B. Exempting Members of Congress from the State Militias 
While debating a bill to regulate the state militias, the House considered 
a provision to exempt from service officers of the national government. Arti-
cle I, section 6, clause 1 of the Constitution states:  
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for 
their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treas-
ury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, 
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during 
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in 
going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or De-
bate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other 
Place. 
William Giles (Va.) objected to exempting members of Congress. He 
quoted Article I, section 6, clause 1 of the Constitution and declared that it set 
out all the privileges to which members of Congress were entitled: “if the 
convention took up this subject (as it is plain from the foregoing clause that 
they did) it is reasonable to presume, that they made a full declaration of all 
our privileges; and it is improper to suppose, that we are possessed of similar 
powers with the convention, and able to extend our own privileges.”101 
C. Removing the Head of an Executive Department 
As previously discussed, a major controversy in the First Congress was 
whether the President had the power to remove a federal officer without the 
advice and consent of the Senate.102 Article II, section 4 of the Constitution 
provides: “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Article I, section 
3, clause 6 gives the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” No 
other provisions deal with removing federal officers. Article II, section 2, 
clause 2 states that the President shall “nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls . . . and all other Officers of the United States.” 
 
100. Id. at 536. 
 101. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 133. 
 102. For more background information on this controversy, see supra notes 46-53 
and accompanying text. 
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Arguing against the President’s removal power, Alexander White (VA) 
denied that there was a defect or “omitted case” in the Constitution, because it 
failed to provide for the removal of officers. Therefore, he argued, Congress 
does not have the power to cure the defect:  
For the constitution having directed by whom the officers shall be 
appointed, it does direct also by whom they shall be removed. . . . 
Sir, this must have been in the contemplation of the gentlemen who 
formed the constitution. Is it probable that they never thought 
about the manner in which an officer should be displaced?103
Abraham Baldwin (Ga.) disagreed with White and argued, “[i]f this had 
been the sense of the Convention who framed the Constitution, the clause ‘to 
be removed in like manner’ would have been added.104 He continued, “no 
such clause is in the constitution; and therefore I should conclude, that the 
convention did not chuse [the Senate] should have the power.” 105 
Roger Sherman (Conn.) also argued against White’s position. Article II, 
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution provides: “Congress may by Law vest 
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” If the 
President is the head of a department, Sherman argued, then Congress can 
authorize him to appoint cabinet heads and remove them.106 White countered 
by saying he would not classify the President as the head of a department: 
“[t]he gentlemen who formed the constitution would not, it seems, give to the 
President at all events the power of appointing these inferior officers to which 
that of removal is attached.”107 
D. Establishing a National Bank 
In the ongoing debate about establishing a national bank,108 James 
Madison disagreed that the necessary and proper clause gave Congress the 
appropriate authority.109 When Congress considered a proposal to establish a 
national bank, James Madison (Va.), who opposed the measure, questioned 
Congress’s authority to pass it: “[h]is impression might perhaps be the 
 
103. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 943. 
 104. Id. at 995. 
 105. Id. at 1005. 
 106. Id. at 917. 
 107. Id. at 944; see also id. at 956 (reporting the same speech). 
 108. For background information, see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
 109. Article I, section 8, clause 18 authorizes Congress to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and 
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 
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stronger, because he well recollected that a power to grant charters of incor-
poration had been proposed in the general convention and been rejected.”110 
3.00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Evils that the Constitutional 
Convention Sought to Avoid 
 
In determining how to implement two provisions of the Constitution, 
some delegates focused on problems that the Convention sought to remedy: 
establishing a national judicial system and naturalizing citizens. 
A. Establishing a System of Lower Federal Courts 
The structure of the federal court system, particularly the creation of in-
ferior courts, was the subject of debate in the First Congress. Article III, sec-
tion 1 of the Constitution provides: “The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.” In opposing a proposal to 
have the state courts serve as the inferior federal courts,111 James Madison 
(Va.) recalled that under the Articles of Confederation, “the judicial was so 
confined as to be of little consequence,” and therefore, under the Constitution, 
“a regular system is provided” in order to make the judiciary an effective 
branch of government. Madison noted that because state courts and their jus-
tices are so dependent on the state legislatures, “permitting them to make the 
federal laws dependent on them would throw us back into all the embarrass-
ments which characterized our former situation.”112 
Michael Jenifer Stone (Md.) argued that a system of inferior courts was 
not necessary. “It appears to me that the present government originated in 
necessity, and it ought not to be carried further than necessity will justify.”113 
According to Stone, “the scheme of the present government was considered 
by those who framed it, as dangerous to the liberties of America”114 because 
of the tensions it created between the national government and the state gov-
ernments: 
[The Framers] supposed that [national government] had a natural 
tendency to destroy the state governments, or on the other hand, 
they supposed that the state governments had a tendency to abridge 
 
110. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 368. See supra note 15 (noting the deviation 
from Madison’s normal refusal to rely on the Constitutional Convention in matters of 
construction). 
 111. See BICKFORD, supra note 5, at 47-49 (summarizing the debate over the 
Judiciary Act). 
 112. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1359. 
 113. Id. at 1371. 
 114. Id. 
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the powers of the general government, therefore it was necessary to 
guard against either taking place, and this was to be done properly 
by establishing a judiciary for the United States.115 
Stone thus saw the necessity of a federal supreme court, but did not find it 
necessary to establish a system of inferior federal courts when the state courts 
could serve their function.116 
B. Naturalizing Citizens 
At the time of the First Congress, there was no uniform rule for citizen-
ship. Instead, citizenship requirements varied from state to state. The First 
Congress debated the parameters of a uniform citizenship rule. Article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 4 authorizes Congress to “establish an uniform Rule of Natu-
ralization.” In February 1790, the House considered a naturalization bill that 
read: 
that all free white persons, who have, or shall migrate into the 
United States, and shall give satisfactory proof, before a magis-
trate, by oath, that they intend to reside therein, and shall take an 
oath of allegiance, and shall have resided within the United States, 
and shall have resided within the United States for one whole year, 
shall be entitled to all the rights of citizenship, except being capa-
ble of holding an office under the state or general government, 
which capacity they are to acquire after a residence of two years or 
more.117 
Because the length of residency required to achieve citizenship varied 
from state to state, Thomas Hartley (Pa.) noted: “[t]he terms of citizenship 
were made too cheap in some parts of the union; now, to say, that a man shall 
be admitted to all the privileges of a citizen, without any residence at all, is 
what can hardly be expected.”118 Roger Sherman (Conn.) argued that the in-
terests of the states and the general government ought to be consulted: 
He presumed it was intended by the convention, who framed the 
constitution, that the congress should have the power of naturaliza-
tion, in order to prevent particular states receiving citizens, and 
 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. XII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 146 (emphasis omitted). 
 118. Id. 
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forcing them upon others, who would not have received them . . .  
upon easier terms than those pursued by the several states.119 
4.00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of the Proceedings of the  
Congress under the Articles of Confederation 
 
Delegates to the First Congress made positive references to provisions 
of the Articles of Confederation and legislative practices under it with respect 
to only two issues: defining the duties of the Secretary of the Treasury and 
assuming state debts. Given the dissatisfaction with the Articles, the paucity 
of references is not surprising. 
4.01. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Successful Practices under 
the Articles of Confederation 
A. Defining the Duties of the Secretary of the Treasury 
In a bill to establish the Department of the Treasury, one clause obligated 
the Secretary of the Treasury “to digest and report plans for the improvement 
and management of the revenue, and the support of the public credit.”120 Article 
I, section 7, clause 1 of the Constitution specifies: “All Bills for raising Reve-
nue shall originate in the House of Representatives . . . .” Some members 
claimed that the proposed clause empowered the Secretary to originate money 
bills, contrary to Article I, section 7, clause 1. Thomas Tucker (S.C.) argued: 
If we authorise him to prepare and report plans, it will create an in-
ference of the executive with the legislative powers, it will abridge 
the particular privilege of this house, for the constitution expressly 
declares, that all bills for raising revenue, shall originate in the 
house of representatives; how can the business originate in this 
house if we have it reported to us by the minister of finance . . . .121 
In support of the bill, James Madison (Va.) cited the actions of the Con-
gress under the Articles of Confederation to demonstrate that it created no 
danger: “[t]hese are precisely the words used by the former congress, on two 
occasions, one in 1783, the other in a subsequent ordinance, which estab-
lished the revenue board, the same power was also annexed to the office of 
 
119. Id. at 147. 
 120. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1059. See id. at 1059-76 (reporting the debate on 
this issue). 
 121. Id. at 1059. The controversy was resolved with a successful vote on Thomas 
Fizsimons’s motion to delete the word “report” and replace it with the word “pre-
pare.” Id. at 1072, 1076. 
File: 61659-text.native.1164206890 Created on: 11/14/2006 10:39:00 AM Last Printed: 11/22/2006 6:52:00 AM 
2006] ORIGINAL INTENT 715 
superintendent of finance, but I never yet heard that any inconvenience of 
danger was experienced from the regulation . . . .”122 
B. Assuming State Debts 
When debating whether the national government should assume the 
debts of the states,123 James Jackson (Ga.), speaking in opposition, looked to 
a precedent under the Articles of Confederation Congress.124 Some states had 
voluntarily contributed impost duties — duties they imposed on imports — to 
the Confederation government. Jackson argued that the duties did not corre-
spond to a state’s population, but to the economy of the state.125 Elbridge 
Gerry (Mass.), who supported assumption, disagreed with Jackson’s asser-
tion. 
 
The gentleman [James Jackson (Ga.)] says, when Congress in 
1783, required an impost, it was understood that every state should 
pay her own debts, that Georgia had done what it could, and ought 
not to pay an iota more.126 This is a new doctrine, and is contrary 
to the express stipulations of all the requisitions of Congress [re-
quests for financing from the states], of which I think are between 
twenty and thirty.127 
4.02. In Interpreting the Constitution in Light of Practices under      
the Articles of Confederation, Consider all the Factors                     
that had been Present 
A. Defining the Duties of the Secretary of the Treasury 
Article I, section 7, clause 1 of the Constitution specifies: “All Bills for 
raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives . . . .” In a bill 
to establish the Department of the Treasury, one clause obligated the Secre-
 
122. Id. at 1072.  
 123. For background information on this issue, see supra note 65. 
 124. Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution states: “Congress shall have 
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” 
 125. See XIII DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1701. Jackson was responding to an argu-
ment by Roger Sherman that, according to a 1781 committee report, states had con-
tributed in proportion to the number of their inhabitants.  Id. at 1421. Jackson was 
arguing that states that import more pay proportionately more, and that their reliance 
on imports is not proportionate to their respective populations. Id. at 1701. 
 126. Jackson had stated only that Georgia had contributed heavily to the public 
treasury, because “Georgia manufactures nothing, and imports everything.” Id. at 
1701. 
 127. Id. at 1720. 
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tary of the Treasury “to digest and report plans for the improvement and 
management of the revenue, and the support of the public credit.” Some 
members argued that this clause empowered the Secretary to originate money 
bills, contrary to Article I, section 7, clause 1.128
James Madison (Va.) argued that, under the Articles of Confederation, a 
revenue board had enjoyed these powers and had worked successfully.129 
John Page (Va.) noted, however, that the prior Congress had a check upon 
revenue board misconduct: “the late congress were obliged to submit their 
plans to the state legislatures; consequently there was less danger of undue 
influence.”130 
5.00. Interpret the Constitution in Light of Publications Widely Circu-
lated during the Constitution’s Ratification 
A. Removing the Head of an Executive Department131 
As previously discussed, a major controversy in the First Congress was 
whether the President had the power to remove a federal officer.132 Opposing 
the proposition to give removal power to the President,”, William L. Smith 
(S.C.) noted that he had “examined the subject maturely” and had consulted 
“sensible writers on the subject of the constitution, who had laid it down, that 
the senate ought to be consulted in the removal as well as in the appointment 
of officers.”133 Smith claimed to find support for his position in The Federal-
ist: “[o]ne, in particular, under the signature of PUBLIUS, who had commented 
with extensive learning, and with the most profound sagacity, had expressed 
fully that opinion.”134 
128. For background on this debate, see supra notes 120-22 and accompanying 
text. 
 129. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1072. 
 130. Id. at 1073. 
 131. Article II, section 4 of the Constitution provides: “The President, Vice Presi-
dent and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Im-
peachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors.” Article I, section 3, clause 6 gives the Senate “the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments.” No other provisions deal with removing federal officers. Article II, 
section 2, clause 2 states that the President shall “nominate, and by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls . . . and all other Officers of the United States.” 
 132. For background on this controversy, see supra note 46-53, 72. 
 133. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 843.  
 134. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 843; see also id. at 853, 861 (reporting the same 
statement in The Gazette of the United States and The Congressional Register, respec-
tively); id. at 935 (reiterating his reliance on The Federalist). Smith was referring to 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 77. See id. at 843 n.7. “The consent of ‘the Senate’ would be 
necessary to displace as well as appoint. . . . Those who can best estimate the value of 
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Abraham Baldwin (Ga.) argued that the proposal would violate the prin-
ciple of separation of powers by “mingling the powers of the president and 
senate.”135 He referred to one delegate to the Convention, presumably El-
bridge Gerry (Mass.)136 who “called it a monstrous and unnatural connection; 
and did not hesitate to affirm, it would bring convulsions to govern-
ment.”137Gerry continued to raise concerns about the lack of separation of 
powers during the ratification debates, particularly in his letter to the Massa-
chusetts legislature in October 1787.138 Moreover, Baldwin noted: “[t]his 
objection was not confined to the walls of the convention; it has been the 
subject of newspaper declamation, and perhaps justly so.”139 
James Jackson (Ga.) also spoke against the proposal. As for the relation-
ship between the executive and the legislative, he found them intertwined and 
considered the senate as part of the executive, and the President as part of the 
legislative. He appealed to the work called the FEDERALIST, as confirmation 
of this.140 He also encouraged his colleagues to read the speeches that James 
Wilson delivered at Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention declaring that “the 
senate was constituted a check upon the president.”141 According to Jackson: 
“[t]his sentiment is confirmed by other writers of reputation.”142 
B. Establishing a National Bank 
Article I, section 8, clause 18 authorizes congress to “make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” When Con-
gress considered a proposal to establish a national bank,143 James Jackson 
(Ga.) argued that the proposal contravened the spirit of the Constitution by 
creating “a monopoly of a very extraordinary nature . . . . He then read sev-
 
a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a provision, which connects the 
official existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body 
[the Senate] . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 62, at 
515-16. Smith probably knew the identities of PUBLIUS. See RAKOVE, supra note 15, 
at 350. However, he may not have known which author wrote which paper. See XIV 
DHFFC at 421 n.20.  
 135. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1003-04. 
 136. See id. at 1004 n.32. 
 137. Id. at 1004. 
 138. See id. at 1004 n.32. 
 139. Id. at 1004. 
 140. Id. at 948.; see also id. at 970 (reporting the same speech in The Congres-
sional Register). 
 141. Id. at 1002-03. For more information on Jackson’s speech on this point, see 
supra text accompanying note 50. 
 142. XI DHFFC, supra note 5, at 1003.  
 143. For background information on this issue, see supra notes 53-54. 
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eral passages from The Federalist, which he said were directly contrary to the 
assumption of power proposed by the bill.”144 However, those passages ar-
gued that the necessary and proper clause should be read expansively.145 
Shortly thereafter, he again read from The Federalist “to shew that the as-
sumption of this power, agreeable to the sentiments of the author of those 
pieces, would be contrary to the constitution, the powers of Congress being 
particularly defined.”146 Elias Boudinot (N.J.) quoted from the same issue of 
The Federalist as well as from The Federalist No. 23 to argue that the clause 
in question was sufficiently broad enough to authorize Congress to establish a 
national bank.147
III. CONCLUSION 
It has been argued that for the Founders, “original intent” referred only 
to what could be gleaned from the Constitution’s language and the use of 
structural means of interpretation but not from the personal intentions of the 
Founders. The present study opens this argument to reevaluation. In the 
Founding Era, the debates over the Constitution’s scope permitted a broader 
array of evidence, including the purposes, expectations and intentions of the 
individuals and gatherings that created the document. At the same time, this 
study shows that the compromises and decisions of the First Congress re-
sulted from both interest politics and a variety of arguments, including 
originalist arguments, which were sometimes raised on opposite sides of the 
same issue. This process has always been typical of legislatures.148 
144. XIV DHFFC, supra note 5, at 364. See id. at 376 (reading from The Federal-
ist “to shew that the assumption of this power, agreeable to the sentiments of the au-
thor of those pieces [presumably Hamilton, who advocated a national bank], would be 
contrary to the constitution, the powers of Congress being particularly defined.”). 
 145. Elias Boudinot (N.J.) disclosed that Jackson had read from The Federalist 
No. 44 and then read from it to document the argument that the necessary and proper 
clause had to be read broadly, because it was impractical to include in the Constitu-
tion a positive enumeration of all national governmental powers. See id. at 439 (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (ALEXANDER HAMILTON), supra note 62, at 304). Based 
on his remarks, Boudinot thought the author of the paper was Madison, who opposed 
a national bank, while the author was Hamilton who advocated it. See XIV DHFFC, 
supra note 5, at 439. At this time, authorship of the individual papers was not gener-
ally known. See id. at 421 n.20. 
 146. Id. at 376. I would surmise that Jackson realized the error in his first interpre-
tation of Federalist No. 44 and was now correcting himself. Apparently, Jackson 
correctly believed that the author of the paper was Hamilton. 
 147. Id. at 439. The Federalist No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) argues that the na-
tional government should have unlimited power in matters of common defense. 
 148. “While rational argument remains an important currency [in legislative deci-
sion making], the ability to negotiate and moderate views in the context of such nego-
tiation is equally important.” ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 67 (1997). During his 
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For example, in a speech opposing the establishment of a national bank, 
Madison allowed the use of “contemporary expositions given to the constitu-
tion.”149 Under this canon of construction, he introduced evidence on the sen-
timents expressed in various state ratifying conventions that the necessary and 
proper clause should be narrowly construed.150 Thus, he relied on legislative 
history – not contemporary expositions of meaning – to argue that Congress 
lacked the authority to establish the bank. In doing so, Madison deviated from 
the purely textual British tradition that did not employ legislative history to 
construe statutory text.151 Despite this deviation, Madison apparently ex-
pected his argument to be persuasive to his colleagues. His choice of argu-
ment suggests that when it came to rules of construction, the Founders were 
not purely textualists, but were often pragmatic politicians. 
The originalist arguments, moreover, have an air of practicality to them. 
Minimal reflection on the categories of argument and the arguments them-
selves confirms that they are not highly rarified. Putting aside the burden of 
dealing with the eighteenth-century rhetorical style of public debate, the 
modern reader can easily understand the concerns of the debaters. Perhaps the 
most theoretical issue that arises is separation of powers. Yet, in discussing 
proposals dealing with the allocation of power and the potential blending of 
powers between the executive and the legislative branches, the reader under-
stands that the issue is not about a blind aspiration to a rigid separation of 
powers. Rather it is about deciding how best to make decisions without allo-
cating too much power to one branch and thus inviting despotic rule and cor-
ruption.  
The originalist arguments were one type of persuasive argument among 
many. They arose in debates on serious topics and seemed to play the greatest 
role in debates on the most controversial issues. Primarily, these were the 
debates over the President’s removal power and assumption of the states’ 
debts, some of which divided the country according to the particular interests 
of the various states.  
Debates with regional implications included those over abolishing slav-
ery, taxing the slave trade, assuming the states’ debts, which would disfavor 
states that had worked to pay off much of their financial obligations, and es-
tablishing a uniform naturalization law, which would disfavor states with 
liberal naturalization laws.  
An examination of the arguments, the presenters, and the context sug-
gests that the debates were generated by both matters of constitutional policy 
and political pragmatism. For example, although Madison had argued in The 
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Federalist for a broad reading of the necessary and proper clause, he opposed 
reading the clause broadly enough to authorize a national bank. Madison’s 
position may have rested merely on political theory and the legislative history 
of the state ratifying conventions. However, his position and arguments may 
also have found roots in the belief that such a bank would favor the Northern 
states over the Southern states, and could have stemmed from his desire to 
win reelection when he had barely won his seat the first time. 
A negotiated settlement of an issue can overcome constitutional scru-
ples. For example, despite the many constitutional and originalist arguments 
on the authority of Congress to assume the debts of the states, the Congres-
sional parties acquiesced to assumption when offered a compromise in which 
states like Virginia which, for example, would receive some reimbursement 
for the debt it had already paid off and gain the location of the permanent 
capital of the country along the Potomac.152 
In academic discussions about originalism, scholars sometimes make an 
effort to identify consistent theories of constitutional construction employed 
by the Founders. According to one theory, they relied solely on the text of the 
document and ignored its legislative history.153 In contrast, others would ar-
gue that consulting original intent was always a permissible tool of construc-
tion.154 And puzzlement is inevitable when the Founders occasionally fail to 
conform with the chosen theory. It is quite likely that the Founders were both 
intellectuals and pragmatic politicians who were not concerned with hewing a 
perfectly consistent line. And, as one scholar has noted, “history is indetermi-
nate.”155 
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